Notes on Structure- Part 3, Philosophical Materialism

For the purpose of this essay, in consideration of social ontology, we will assume several general ontological and epistemological features in accordance with “philosophical materialism,” the position under-girding critical realism.¹ The doctrine of philosophical materialism is composed of three interlocking principles:

Cogito ergo material girl

First, reality’s “being” occurs solely within an immanent plane of possibilities, bounded by its spatial and temporal dimensions. Such immanence entails ontological materialism, which asserts the stratification of reality and emergence² of independent properties and causal powers at each level. Higher levels supervene on the lower in a relationship of unilateral dependence, but are not reducible to them in terms of the laws that govern the lower. Consequently, the social unilaterally depends on agental practice and psychology, which in turn is presupposed by more fundamental levels: biology, chemistry and physics. The theory of emergence is an axiom of such a stratified model of reality, and suggests, for instance, psychology is not merely applied biology, nor chemistry applied physics. The stratified nature of reality and theory of emergence counters reductionist models such as “eliminative materialism” in philosophy of the mind and scientific reductionist models that ultimately seek to explain all being in terms of particle physics, string theory or some other master explanans. As well, the reductionist project to link individual and group behavior to natural selection and genetics, undertaken most vigorously within evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, is problematized.

1The theory of materialism we employ is described in “Materialism.” Bashkar, Roy, from A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Tom Bottomore, ed. 1999. Blackwell Publishers Inc. (369-373).

2The term “emergence” has two distinct meanings. The common usage denotes historical emergence, with no implied ontological claim necessary, in the sense of some entity or process coming into existence at a particular time and place. For example– “fascist ideology emerged in the post-WWI era as a viable political program out of debates over the perceived weakness of liberal democracy and dangers of communism.” In contrast, the theory of emergence examines the conditions of possibility for an ontological emergence of independent existent layers of reality and causal mechanisms that operate there. This second meaning informs the following: “social structures emerge from agental practice, becoming the conditions for the future reproduction and transformation of practice.”

[The second and third aspects are due soon]

Notes on Structure- Part 2

The concept of structure having independent causal power qualifies it as ontological in nature. In the social world, the ontological question revolves around the nature of social reality for all peoples in all times. Such a social ontology is related to the more general conception of ontology as a branch of metaphysical speculation concerned with the question of “being” of all things existent within reality

Quarks Upon Turtles

(quarks, emotions, truth, chairs, planets, universe(s), God and so forth). Ontology seeks to understand the generative principles accounting for the extension of all existing things, including inquiry into what appears to be basic coordinates of being: time and space and action of being, that is to say, causation. General ontological questions include speculation on possible modes and categories of being, the qualities of being and what necessary and sufficient conditions presuppose being. Consequently, general ontological questions presuppose social ontological ones, or conversely, social ontological features supervene on the general.

Notes on Structure- Part 1

Coming to terms with the meaning of “structure” is a problem. The term is used ubiquitously throughout the social sciences, often causally, but also with a specific definition or logic in relation to the particular social theoretical tradition employed. Structures are generally identified as having a more or less discreet set of relationships among component parts. We use structure as a synonym for a building, as in “what is that structure over there?” We can inquire into the structure of the US government, a cell or the parts of

Destructure

speech in language. In the mid-20^th century, “structural functionalism,” a social scientific philosophy prevalent in sociology and anthropology, understood society as a set (structure) of inter-related elements (norms, beliefs, practices, values, institutions) that “function” together, producing a stable and coherent collective entity. In addition, consider the titles of two works of epistemology: Thomas Kuhn’s infamous, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and Lawrence Bonjour’s, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1985).¹ Kuhn attempts to uncover the archetypical process through which scientific revolutions unfold and the consequential incommensurability of different paradigms of scientific knowledge. Bonjour argues in favor of a “coherence theory of truth,” to combat skepticism and to critique foundationalist accounts of empirical knowledge. Structure, as used by Kuhn and Bonjour in their titles, is deployed to signify that their epistemological investigations account for all core features, processes and practices relevant to full knowledge (in their view) of their subject matter: scientific paradigm shifts or a coherentist account of empirical knowledge justification. The examples given above are unproblematic usages of the term, “structure,” employed as an analytical device to make sense of a complicated world of entities and processes within it (a cell, society or knowledge production, etc.). It denotes more or less coherent and bounded sets of relationships among component parts of a larger whole or process. Complications and controversies arise for “structure” when a definition or understanding of it grants structure ontological reality and emergent causal powers. Structure, in this sense, is not merely a heuristic device to aid analysis and understanding, but rather, out of the relationships among the elements held in structure (however defined), emerges an independent causal power not reducible to its component parts.

1. I include these two examples, somewhat randomly, because they sit on my bookshelf.

Alexander Boguslawski’s New Painting “Three Philosophers” (or three sages in fancy hats)

"Three Philosophers" by Alexander Boguslawski

My friend and artist, Dr. Professor Alexander Boguslawski just finished another one of his brilliant paintings.  This one is called “Three Philosophers” (or three sages in fancy hats).  As you may have already guessed the three philosophers are the artist’s ingenious depiction of Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Zizek, and Jacques Derrida.  There are many hidden jokes in this painting which makes it especially fun for those who are familiar with postmodern theory and psychoanalysis.

Dr. Alexander Boguslawski is professor of Russian Literature at Rollins College.  He was formally trained as an artist in Poland where he grew up before coming to the United States where he received his doctorate in Russian Literature.

One can examine his other “magical” paintings here.

Alexander Boguslawski– A Painting

Boguslawski-- "The Truth is Out There"

I have acquired this extraordinary “magical” painting for my office.  It was done by Alexander Boguslawski –a professor of Russian Literature and Aesthetics at Rollins College.

The Truth Is Out There was inspired by stories of UFOs, but these stories were, of course, filtered through the artist’s imagination.  Since in most of the artist’s works we see fantasy worlds, this painting actually shows a meeting between the earthlings and the extraterrestrials, each inhabiting a world of their own. The extraterrestrial spaceship is a city built of a green material, and its foundations rest on sculpted female and male heads.  The ship’s body conceals the rest of the city, but it is obvious that much must be going on within (the viewers need to imagine what exactly is going on).  Some things are clear, however.  The extraterrestrials are lovers of books;  they emerge from the domed library and descend through the opening in one of the heads to the landing pad, from where, as we can see, they climb down to earth and bring the offering of books to the gathered crowd.  The extraterrestrials seem to be of two kinds — the tall ones (apparently the leaders and the brains) and the short ones, the workers — mutations of Mickey Mouse and watermelons. They are surrounded by many extraordinary creatures, among which are huge birds they use as means of personal transportation, while their motorized “beanie-prop-hoppers” are capable of transporting at least several crew members.  The earthlings are a colorful lot, as evidenced by their costumes, and they seem to prefer the purple building material.  Of course, the careful observer will notice immediately that there is not much difference between the architectural designs of the earthlings and the extraterrestrials; it is actually possible that the latter visited earth long ago and were inspired by the physical appearance of the earthlings and by their architecture.  It is clear that the earthlings are curious about the visitors and they are greeting them by offering them the keys to their city.  Perhaps this painting provides the artist’s response to the recent slew of movies presenting the visitors from space as evil beings bent on destroying the human race. Or, what is also possible, the artist is communicating his desire that the earthlings read more books!

Bruce Fink Tells a Tale

Bruce Fink a practicing psychoanalyst (who studied under Jacques Lacan) and prolific author in his own right, has recently written a book of three stories entitled, The Psychoanalytic Adventures of Inspector Canal. I just picked this book up a few days ago and finished reading the first of the three stories called “The Case of the Missing Object.” This is a great text and I plan on using this in my course that introduces psychoanalysis to my college students.

The plot takes off because the music director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra has reported the theft of a very old and significant musical score.  The main character, Dr. Canal is a retired inspector from the French Secret Services who now lives in New York.  He is called to the scene by his acquaintance Olivetti who is an inspector in the New York Police Department.  The latter is a blue-collar worker who takes pride in his “common-sense” and practical perspective on the world, whereas Canal is extremely reflective and sees the world as like an icon.  Inspector Canal employs the method of psychoanalysis as a way of uncovering the causes behind certain behaviors, slips, and beliefs all of which animate the characters and the story.  Canal’s brilliance is his mastery grasp on psychoanalysis and how, through this method, he is able to explain certain actions and beliefs and thus, in the final analysis, solve the mystery.   For example, as Canal and Olivetti are on their way to interview the Director, Rolland Saalem, the blue-collar inspector makes a mistake.  This is significant for two reasons.  First, because Olivetti did not know he made a mistake—he led Canal to room number 203 and not 302 (in the director’s office building).  Secondly, Canal is able to explain this mistake using the method of psychoanalysis.  He does this specifically by showing Olivetti’s mistake exposes his real desire to want a ‘2’ and not a ‘3’.  You see Olivetti is a divorcee and now his ex-wife is dating another man—a triangle—i.e., the number 3!  This explains why he made the mistake—Olivetti’s desires moved him to make a “mistake” a slip, as it were, and so he ended up on the second floor (exposing his desire for 2, i.e., his ex-wife and him together) and not their accurate destination, the third floor, room 302.

What makes Fink’s story fun is how the method of psychoanalysis is deployed and moves the plot along until the missing object is finally recovered.  A plot like this can sometimes be annoying in so far as there is a master who is in full control of everything resulting in reducing the reader down to an inert passive observer in a fully determined plot.  But Fink prevents this by having a strong character as the Music Director, Saalem who is smart enough to prevent the bulldozer-like effect of the Master (Canal) from taking hold.  Yet, in the end, Canal is able to figure out where the missing object is, which is a brilliant lesson in itself.  In the process, Fink constructs an extraordinary conversation between Canal and Saalem in which deep existential truths and puzzles (Fink reveals to us how truth and the puzzle are inextricably bound up together) are communicated.  I highly recommend this story and am looking forward to reading the next two stories in his book (if only I can get my book back from my colleague!).

Soul of the Party– Slavoj Zizek

Soul of the party (originally published in NewStatemen April 1, 2010)
St Paul had it right – using religion to rock the foundations of authority.

Why is theology emerging again as a point of reference for radical politics? It is emerging not in order to supply a divine “big other”, guaranteeing the final success of our endeavours, but, on the contrary, as a token of our radical freedom, with no big other to rely on. Fyodor Dostoevsky was aware of how God gives us freedom and responsibility — he is not a benevolent master steering us to safety, but one who reminds us that we are wholly unto ourselves.

The God that we get here is rather like the God from the old Bolshevik joke about a communist propagandist who, after his death, finds himself in hell, where he quickly convinces the guards to let him leave and go to heaven. When the devil notices his absence, he pays a visit to God, demanding that He return to hell what belongs to Satan. However, as soon as he addresses God as “my Lord”, God interrupts him: “First, I am not ‘Lord’, but a comrade. Second, are you crazy, talking to fictions? I don’t exist! And third, be short — otherwise, I’ll miss my party cell meeting!”

This is the kind of God an authentic left needs: a God who wholly “became man” — a comrade among us, crucified together with two social outcasts — and who not only “doesn’t exist” but also himself knows this, accepting his erasure, entirely passing over into the love that binds members of the Holy Ghost (the party, the emancipatory collective). Catholicism is often designated as a compromise between “pure” Christianity and paganism — but what, then, is Christianity at the level of its notion? Protestantism? One should take a further step here: the only Christianity at the level of its notion, which draws all the consequences from its basic event — the death of God — is atheism. The Spanish anarchist Buenaventura Durutti said: “The only church that illuminates is a burning church.” He was right, though not in the anti-clerical sense his remark was intended to have. Religion only arrives at its truth through its self-cancellation.

In “The Intellectual Beast Is Dangerous”, Brecht asserts: “A beast is something strong, terrible, devastating; the word emits a barbarous sound.” Surprisingly, he writes: “The key question, in fact, is this: how can we become beasts, beasts in such a sense that the fascists will fear for their domination?” It is thus clear that, for Brecht, this question designates a positive task, not the usual lament on how Germans, such a highly cultured people, could have turned into the Nazi beasts. “We have to understand that goodness must also be able to injure — to injure savagery.”

It is only against this background that we can formulate the gap that separates oriental wisdom from Christian emancipatory logic. The oriental logic accepts the primordial void or chaos as the ultimate reality and, paradoxically, for this very reason, prefers organic social order with each element in its proper place. At the very core of Christianity, there is a vastly different project: that of a destructive negativity, which does not end in a chaotic void but reverts (and organises itself) into a new order, imposing it on to reality.

For this reason, Christianity is anti-wisdom: wisdom tells us that our efforts are in vain, that everything ends in chaos, while Christianity madly insists on the impossible. Love, especially a Christian one, is definitely not wise. This is why Paul said: “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise” (“Sapientiam sapientum perdam,” as his saying is usually known in Latin). We should take the term “wisdom” literally here: it is wisdom (in the sense of “realistic” acceptance of the way things are) that Paul is challenging, not knowledge as such.

With regard to social order, this means that the authentic Christian tradition rejects the wisdom that the hierarchic order is our fate, that all attempts to mess with it and create another egalitarian order have to end up in destructive horror. Agape as political love means that unconditional, egalitarian love for one’s neighbour can serve as the foundation for a new order.

The form of appearance of this love is what we might also call the idea of communism: the urge to realise an egalitarian social order of solidarity. Love is the force of this universal link that, in an emancipatory collective, connects people directly, in their singularity, bypassing their particular positions in a social hierarchy. Indeed, Dostoevsky was right when he wrote: “The socialist who is a Christian is more to be dreaded than a socialist who is an atheist” — yes, dreaded by his or her enemies.

It was St Paul who provided a surprisingly relevant definition of the emancipatory struggle: “For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against leaders, against authorities, against the world rulers [kosmokratoras] of this darkness, against the spiritual wickedness in the heavens” (Ephesians 6:12). Or, translated into today’s language: “Our struggle is not against concrete, corrupted individuals, but against those in power in general, against their authority, against the global order and the ideological mystification that sustains it.”

One should resolutely reject the liberal-victimist ideology that reduces politics to avoiding the worst, to renouncing all positive projects and pursuing the least bad option. As Arthur Feldmann, a Viennese-Jewish writer, bitterly noted, the price we usually pay for survival is our life.

Slavoj Žižek is a philosopher and critic. His latest book is “First As Tragedy, Then As Farce” and with Creston Davis and John Milbank, “Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology“

Paul’s New Moment– a new book by John Milbank, Slavoj Zizek, and Creston Davis

Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology

Here is a new book that Milbank, Zizek and I wrote, which will be published in the Fall by Brazos Press.  This book examines how Paul gives us the coordinates to breakout of the deadlock of liberal identity politics and into universalism.  This very paradigm has given the foundations on which all subsequent revolutionary gestures are indebted.

Recent studies on Paul in Continental philosophy are simply not radical enough and are not true to the radical logic that is unleashed in the wake of the Incarnation of the God-Man–Jesus Christ.  In this study we make it clear that taking Paul seriously  will radically restructure Continental philosophy and the future of Christian Theology.

The book unfolds in three parts.

First Milbank attacks Agamben’s view of Paul (which puts the latter in an impossible dilemma from which there is no escape).  Zizek then discusses the universal truth to Paul’s own “Truth-Event” (avec et sans Badiou) and I, drawing on Stanislaw Breton, discuss the movement of Paul and  subtraction from Socrates to Hegel.  Here the idea is that Paul’s universalism inheres in the movement of negation beyond Death and thus is joined to philosophy’s destiny.

In the second section, Paul is joined to the cosmic liturgical movement, which is interpreted by Zizek as the birth of the Church in the Spirit (and in the wake of the death of God in Christ).  In this section Catherine Pickstock contributes an extraordinary essay on Paul and the Liturgy and I connect up Paul’s subtractive ontology with Christian worship.

In the third and final section, Milbank engages Alain Badiou and Zizek discusses the future of Christianity in the wake of “Paul’s New Moment.”

Subjects and Truth

Subjects and Truth

Subject & Truth-- by Creston Davis

What is the precise relationship between the subject and truth? This question is more complex than it may first appear, but let’s start with the basic concepts and build from the simple to the complex. So we begin with the two terms that together inspire our question: subjects and truth.

Subject is a term that comes to us with a long but pretty straightforward history that begins (at least according to the Oxford English Dictionary) in the Old French language around the 12th century. The term then was suget, soget, which comes into its present form “subject” in the 15-17th centuries. The term’s prefix “sub” comes from the Latin meaning “under” or “subordinate.” To be subject is to be subordinate to the power of a ruler. In Medieval times this meant to be under the rule and protection of a monarch or prince. When the nature of political power shifted away from monarchical rule (grounded in a theology called “Divine Right”) and into the form of a modern-nation state (grounded in a purely secular foundation debarred from transcendence) one would think that the very meaning of term “subject” too would shift.

But it is curious to explore why this term’s core nature remains constant while the structure of power that determines the very meaning of the term “subject” changes. In other words, I want to try to explain why something (in this case the “subject”) remains constant while that which defines the term “subject” changes. Again the political power structure shifts from a monarchical form to a secular state structure. In England this happens much sooner than elsewhere in the European mainland. Think of the two big revolutions in political power that happen nearly synonymously within a single historical epoch: The United States’ Revolution 1776 and The French Revolution in 1789. Although each revolution unfolded in terms of its own determinative logic, it can be said that despite their differences the ideas and philosophies that motivated these two great events were similar. Indeed the single philosophical trend responsible for animating the great revolutions was the Enlightenment at the core of which stood the twin stance of:

1- The Sovereignty of the Subject as Absolute
2- The Unchecked Power of Reason as an Ahistorical Universal Truth

And it was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who united these two Enlightenment Axioms into a singular indistinguishable unit that was at the same time a Universal ethical imperative. For all human action, according to Kant had to fold to the universal logic of reason itself under the banner of “duty.” Finally it is the duty of all reasonable persons “subjects” to perform that action which itself conforms to the ahistorical logic of Reason alone irrespective of one’s tradition or metanarrative truth-claims. To state this in its negative form would be to say that anyone who broke the Universal-Ethical-Law by not obeying the demand of duty must thus be irrational and contradictory and therefore not a “subject” at all.

Much of all this is very complicated, but if we take a step-back and look at the transformation from the Monarch to the Nation-State we see that philosophy via the Enlightenment greatly assisted in this transition—which at the same time—registered one of philosophies greatest contradictions—a contradiction embedded in the very name of Enlightenment “logical coherence.” Here then is my thesis:

The movement from the Monarch to the Nation-State did not free the subject from its subornation to political power it simply shifted the power-source itself. In other words—this is the very heart of the logic of equivocation! (saying one thing, but meaning an entirely different thing).

In this precise respect Monarchical rule and the Secular Nation-State simply function in the same way relative to the subject. But just as Monarchical rule has its mythos that grounded its authority in something external to itself (i.e., a theology) so too the Nation-State has its “story” grounded in falsehood. What is this duplicity of the Secular Nation-State form? It is the idea that the Subject is the ground of absolute authority as such—but really it is not the subject who has authority but rather a disembodied Universal Logic called Reason that places its absolute demand onto the human subject to OBEY! In other words, you are free to do as you please so long as you OBEY the demand of Universal Reason! This is the updated version of a theology that tells you to “Love God and do what you please!” And this precise demand to OBEY is the legal logic employed by the Nation-State in order to maintain peace (i.e., to maintain its own power).

Of course the logic of the modern Nation-State is much more controlling than a simple Kantian articulation of a Universal Law of Reason. But it is interesting to trace the logic of power via historic paradigm shifts—shifts that potentially are able to liberate the subject from oppressive power-relations. But in each case philosophy (or theology) is there to send out an equivocal message: You are free! Or Sapere aude! (Dare to know!), so long as you OBEY the superego! Thus, the subject is given a desire to fulfill the law even at the cost of undoing itself!

In this respect—the subject is sundered from truth—form liberation! The question we are left with then is not: Can the Subject be liberated from Obeying…but rather who or what are you going to obey? I would suggest to Obey the demands of an impersonal Universal Law is to surrender any possibility for any future freedom at all. Freedom in this case may be see not in obedience but in the disobedience to the logic of abstract enslavement.

Cryin’ Wolf on that Social Distortion–Hegel’s Negation of Negation by Megan Flocken

My reading finds double negation to be the mechanism by which spirit is actualized. I hope the following will illustrate how the master/slave mentality demands a simple negation; Hegelian immanent transcendence requires a double negation.

Double negation is “the return-to-oneself from alienation” (Zizek, 72). The individual is alienated from self in her divergence with the law through simple negation. For example, I understand running a redlight to be against the law; I run the redlight and acknowledge my act to be against the law…I feel guilty, afraid…I am a criminal. The logic of simple negation is the same as the master/slave: I know the master, I am the slave, I act in independence of the master as I can understand the master to be dependent on me. My freedom is contingent on, in fact rooted in my slavery. Hence, when I act independently I am alienated from my very constitutive substance (as a slave).

The negation of the negation is a freer space. This is a process of dissolution, by which the law is impotized! This is not a master/slave interdependence (a la Badiou’s “occupation”). The master/slave relation is one of simple negation: I acknowledge the law (I am a slave)…I understand the law to be validated in my servitude (I am the foundation of the lord’s subjection over me). Instead, the negation of the negation is the loss of the loss. My act is not a loss, in lack of conformity to the law, but in certainty/faith, in fullness of my embodiment of right. I may break the law, and I do so always with respect to the law. This is self-consciousness (in simple negation). But the revolutionary dissolution of the law is possible with double negation. I run the redlight, I break the law, without acknowledging the power of the law to confine me, i.e., to stop, to feel guilt in my flight. The law is meaningless to me in my absolute right. The law cannot deliver me from the risk of decision…from the abyss of my determining the right.

We find that in place of us positing the presupposition (i.e. observing Reason, which searches for and finds itself), the Spirit is what presupposes the positing (thanks, Zizek, “Sublime Object of Ideology”). In explanation: I create/inform my world while the world creates/informs me. Why and by what logic? I at first understand my action to break the law (simple negation). For example, I am bourgeoisie, yet I do not act as though I am bourgeoisie. I then understand the law to be breaking me (I am the absolute right! I am me without adhering to a universal law of class). In the negation of the negation, the very loss is lost (Zizek, 72). There is no comparative action to the objective universal…The reified substance of law (the master, the slave) empties to the subjectivized virtual substance (Zizek, 76): the spirit is the activity of individuals in their finitude. My practice determines the right. I am not the independent agent/controller of process; instead, WE witness and participate in its unfolding. The negation of the negation is the space in which we, in finite particularity, actualize; in living, we deny the authority of exterior law to encumber us. Not as rebels (i.e. with respect of law, in motive to break the law), the negation of the negation relegates the law to a figment (my action need not consult “the law” because the law has no authority over me). Thus, Spirit exists only insofar as subjects act as if it exists, and as subjects neglect to act as though their circular Reason dictates them to act…as lawbreakers.

Spirit is not a reified, magical phantom, like exchange value and commodity. Spirit is the actualization of culture, ethics, and intention. It is a historical incident that defies quantification. It is insensible but always demonstratable. It is because it IS…and it undergirds all action and is the culmination of all action. The Spirit is the “full acceptance of the abyss” (Zizek, 72), and in this way, it is both giving and receiving form. The abyss is anathema to Reason’s hegemonic dissection of the real…which produces a virtuality of the real. The real is virtualized in Reason through elimination of all actual remainder, unintendedness. Ironically, the real is made tangible, intelligible by its mapping in virtual space–conception. This  desert (of the real) finds that only the mirage…the insensible unity and locus of actualization, is capable of keeping one from death…the ultimate alienation from self. Only our unmappable incidents can defy our illusions. And so in revolt of the unmappable, the Spirit is transfigured to be reich, ideology, and process alike. Rightfully as geist, Spirit is the club and the secret passcode…as practice it conditions our consciousness and self-consciousness, and as thought it opens and transforms our practice. It is the contradiction implicit to being, both universal and particular. It embodies and exhibits the substance as subject. As it signals the future and pays homage to our past, it is our return from alienation to what is and it is our springboard to beyond…which is simply our connection to one another.